This paper explores the similarities between the EU's system of administrative implementation of its legislative acts, and the German and American systems of administrative implementation of their respective federal laws. The article will also study the connection between the principle of sincere cooperation, established in the EU Treaties, and equivalent principles which exist in federal legal orders, namely the "Bundestreue" principle. The EU system appears to be closer to the German model of federalism than the US. Despite the federal inspiration, one cannot say that the principle of sincere cooperation is a federalising influence on the EU. E -73
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The case-law of the CJEU has thus taken this Treaty provision as a way of reinforcing the effectiveness of other obligations under Community law, and as a basis for limiting the exercise of powers by the Member States in the event of non-existence of a specific Treaty obligation (Constantinesco 1987: 110-11; Klamert 2013: 62 ss.) . The Court started to allow an expansive force (or broad interpretation) of the general duty of cooperation envisaged in this provision, especially the obligation of each Member State to "facilitate the achievement of the Union's tasks" and to refrain to "from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the (ECJ, Case 44/84, Hurd v Jones, 1986 ECR 29, nº 39; and Blanquet 1994: 306 ss.) . Currently the prevailing view is that this provision, when certain requirements are met, may establish autonomous duties for Member States or for institutions not expressly provided for in EU law. Thus, even where there is no specific provision establishing a Member State's duty to cooperate, its conduct may still infringe the duty of sincere cooperation laid down in Article 4 (3) TEU.
Some examples will illustrate the evolution. First of all, in the context of Competition Law, in the words of the CJEU, "while it is true that Article [101 TFEU] is directed at undertakings, nonetheless it is also true that the Treaty imposes a duty on Member States not to adopt or maintain in force any measure which could deprive that provision of its effectiveness" -these are obligations for Member States, arising from the principle of sincere cooperation, which are not expressly provided for in the Treaty text (ECJ, Case 13/77, INNO v ATAB, 1977 ECR 2115 . In another example, the Court distinguished between the obligation to transpose directives, which derives directly from Article 288 TFEU, and the obligation to adopt a series of additional or consequential acts, whether normative or not, to ensure their application and effectiveness in the internal legal order, arising from Article 4 (3) TEU and the principle of sincere cooperation (Lang 2003 (Lang : 1937 (Lang -1938 Craig 1997: 519-538 ).
The wording of Article 4 (3) TEU is still extremely relevant in this matter. This rule consists of three paragraphs. The first paragraph establishes the duty of respect and mutual 
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assistance between the Member States and the EU in "carrying out tasks which flow from the Treaties". In the second paragraph and in the first part of the third paragraph, we find positive obligations (or general obligations) of the Member States regarding the EU. The former can be considered as an obligation of result -in the sense that the Member States must take measures capable of ensuring compliance with the obligations arising from Union law -and the latter an obligation of means -Member States are obliged to make available all the necessary means to "facilitate the achievement of the Union's tasks". In the second paragraph, we find a reference not only to the obligations arising from the Treaty, but also to acts of the EU institutions -legislative and non-legislative acts of all institutions.
In the final part of the third paragraph a negative obligation (or general prohibition) can be identified, preventing Member States from adopting "any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the Union's objectives".
This means that, in accordance with the principle of sincere cooperation, the Member States have the duty not only to implement EU law, but to ensure its effectiveness. Also, in this context, the duty to implement EU law covers the entire corpus of EU law (the French "bloc de légalité"), including all EU law (e.g. the EU Treaty and the TFEU) and all secondary legislation (e.g. international agreements EU, regulations, directives and decisions).
In so far as the principle of sincere cooperation involves a duty of the Member States to respect EU law and to assist the EU in the pursuit of its objectives, this results in a limitation of the Member State's autonomy. In fact, since the autonomy of the Member States has to be reconciled and balanced with its duty to cooperate with the EU, the principle of sincere cooperation can be seen as an integration tool (Pernice 1999: 742) and the counterpoint, to some extent, to the principle of autonomy of Member States (Moreno Molina 1998: 44; 2000: 152) .
However, the principle of cooperation is two-way: not only are the Member States bound by it, but also the EU. It applies to the mutual relationship between them, also guaranteeing that the EU institutions are obliged to respect the autonomy of the Member States and to ensure the coherence of their joint action. This can also be seen in Article 4 (2) TEU, which establishes the duty of the Union to respect the national identity and diversity of the Member States. 'Les Verts' v European Parliament, 1986 ECR 1339 Case C-345/95, French Republic v European Parliament, 1997 ECR I-5215, nº 31) . Likewise, in a situation where, in the absence of action by the Council, it is the Commission which acts, it must do so through effective cooperation with the Member States (ECJ, Case 325/85, Communities, 1987 ECR 5041, nº 15-17) . However, the CJEU has also ruled that the adoption of a legislative act by the Council could not result in breach of the duty to cooperate even if it were to run counter to the interests invoked by a Member State (ECJ, Portuguese Republic and Kingdom of Spain v Council of the European Communities, 1992 ECR I-5073, nº 53). Thus, the regular exercise of the powers of the institutions cannot be regarded as an infringement of the principle of sincere cooperation.
Ireland v Commission of the European
Despite this mutual nature, it is undeniable that the case-law of the CJEU has more significantly developed Member States' duties of cooperation, support and respect of EU law, in particular the duty to implement EU law.
The scope of the principle of cooperation also encompasses the relationship between national and EU legal systems. In the absence of a specific Treaty rule governing the relationship, it is Article 4 (3) TEU which ultimately serves that purpose (Lang 2003 (Lang : 1905 (Lang -1906 , guaranteeing the unity of the EU legal order.
Indeed, the autonomy of the various agents (Member States or EU institutions), and of the various legal systems, can pose a threat to the effective and coherent application of EU law throughout the single market. Legal and political conflicts between the agents, arising from the tension generated between the need for unity and their institutional autonomy, require the existence of adequate response mechanisms -and one of these mechanisms is the principle of cooperation. In providing a legal basis for the solution of possible normative conflicts and tensions between the several states' legal systems and the Union's legal system, the principle of sincere cooperation has a function which is similar to, and indeed comparable with, the principles that, in a federation, regulate the relation between federal law and state law (ensuring the prevalence of former over the latter).
In the more specific dimension of the regulation of the action of the administrations of the Member States and of the EU it is the principle of sincere cooperation which lends the EU its constitutional and administrative cooperative nature (Kahl 2002: 445; also Häberle 1978: 141-177; Schmidt-Aßmann 1996: 270-301) .
Administrative implementation of EU law and the principle of sincere cooperation
The duty of the Member States to implement EU law falls on all their public bodies and powers. There are legislative, judicial and administrative spheres of implementation of EU law. The rules applicable to the first two cases are not, however, easily applicable in the third case.
Regarding the legislative power, when, according to the principles of attribution, subsidiarity and proportionality, a given subject falls within the EU's legislative sphere of competence, conflict situations between EU legislative provisions (regulations, directives or decisions) and rules of the Member States (laws or regulations) should be resolved by the principles of primacy, direct applicability and direct effect. In relation to the judiciary, there is a separation of spheres of action and control of validity between EU and national courts, but it is mandatory for national courts to apply EU law as interpreted by the CJEU (Cassese 2004a: 35; Ruffert 2011: 277-306) .
None of these scenarios is necessarily repeated in the administrative field. In a multilevel structure with the power to adopt legislative acts, such as the EU, one of the questions that need to be addressed is the distribution of (administrative) implementing powers through the various entities involved. Hamburg-Jonas, 1972 ECR 00307, p. 10; Cases 205 to 215/82, Deutsche Milchkontor GmbH and others v Federal Republic of Germany, 1983 ERC 2633, p. 17 e 19; Case C-290/91, Johannes Peter v Hauptzollamt Regensburg, 1993 ECR I-02981, p. 8; Case C-285/93, Dominikanerinnen-Kloster Altenhohenau v Hauptzollamt Rosenheim, 1995 ECR I-4069, p. 26; Case C-292/97, Kjell Karlsson and Others, 2000 ECR I-2737, p 
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The CJEU has already stated that, "in the fields covered by European Union law, (…) the public authorities of the Member States are bound by a duty of sincere cooperation.
Under that principle, they must take any appropriate measure, general or particular, to The "dédoublement fonctionnel" of national administrations poses extremely complex problems. First of all, because national administrations themselves are bound by a much larger set of legal rules ("bloc légal"), and must not only continue to pursue the national public interest but also -in the same way -the public interest of the European Union. This may give rise to conflicts as to the relevance of the public interests in question -since the public interest which must be pursued at the EU level may be different from that which the national law determines (Kadelbach 1999: 32-35) .
Why does the EU entrust the task of administrative implementation of EU law, as a rule, to the Member States?
Several reasons seem to contribute to this legal solution. 
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rather, because of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved at Union level (Article 5 (3) TEU). Finally, it follows from the principle of proportionality that the content and form of EU action cannot go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives set out in the Treaties (Article 5 (4) TEU). Subsidiarity and proportionality are corollary to the principle of conferral. They determine the extent to which the EU can exercise the powers conferred on it by the Treaties.
The principle of subsidiarity regulates the distribution of competences between the EU and the Member States, primarily in terms of legislative power. However, the same normative content -the same criterion -can also be applied to executive powers: in principle, the implementation of EU legislative acts should belong to the level of power which is closest to the citizens -the level of the Member States -except in exceptional situations where that implementation should be at EU level (Lucia 2012: 17-45, 23) .
What was said above does not mean that the EU has no powers of administrative implementation of EU law.
In fact, the implementation of EU law can fall -in a secondary, subsidiary or exceptional way, -to the EU institutions (Schütze 2012: 55 ss.; Moreno Molina 1998: 45).
This was established in Article 291 (2) TFEU, which provides that "where uniform conditions for implementing legally binding Union acts are needed", the legislative acts in question should "confer implementing powers on the Commission, or, in duly justified specific cases and in the cases provided for in Articles 24 and 26 of the Treaty on European Union, on the Council". In this way, it is recognised that the Union can implement its legislative acts when the adoption of "uniform conditions of implementation" is necessary, which can be interpreted as a reference to the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality.
It is in these circumstances that the EU's own public administration becomes evident: the administrative apparatus that is accountable to the institutions, and the EU bodies and entities that have the attribution and competence of administrative enforcement of EU law in particular.
Where there is EU competence to implement EU law, the body responsible for such implementation will, as a general rule, be the Commission. In matters of common foreign and security policy it is the Council which has the implementing powers -as well as in 
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This therefore means recognising an autonomous type of enforcement of EU law, with a focus on cooperative (vertical or horizontal) mechanisms -joint implementation or coadministration -involving procedures in which the EU administration and national administrations cooperate to meet the common interest in the application of EU law. The notion of administrative cooperation in joint implementation may cover distinct doctrinal concepts such as: multi-level administration, association of administrations or administrative federation (Verwaltungsverbund) or mixed administration.
In short, the regime of administrative implementation of EU law is complex and composite.
In certain areas, the implementation power of national authorities prevails, but in others it is up to the supranational level authorities to execute EU laws, which complicates 
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The CJEU's gradual construction of the principle of sincere cooperation, and its ramifications, does not appear to have been significantly challenged by the Member States or institutions. The principle has been peacefully applied not only by the Court but also by the other institutions of the EU and by the Member States.
This process raises the following question: what was the inspiration for the CJEU in the initial formulation of the principle and its subsequent evolution? The correct answer seems impossible to find, not only because it was a gradual construction, but also because of the specific characteristics of the CJEU. This is not just because it is a collegiate body (like so many other judicial bodies), but especially because of its system of functioning. In particular, it is impossible to know in which way Justices decide (the secrecy of their deliberations is particularly rigid), and why, with the same applying to the rules of procedure. The Opinions of the Advocates-General, addressing the principle and its wording, also provide no clue as to their origin.
It is therefore believed that the most likely answer will come from multiple origins; here inspirations from both principles of International Law and from the principles of "federal loyalty", recognised in federal states, can be listed. It is not unusual for treaties of international organisations to incorporate reinforced dimensions of the principles of good faith, and pacta sunt servanda as an institutionalised form, to ensure the pursuit of the organisation's ends. The scope of these legal principles (and their implications) depends, to a large extent, on the capacity of the legal system in which they are inserted to ensure compliance with them -notably through effective judicial instruments. This is the distinctive character of the principle of cooperation within the EU. follows from the federal principle that there is a constitutional duty of reciprocal loyalty and mutual understanding between its members (horizontal, between states, and vertical, between these and the federation). According to the BVerfG, "the essence of the constitutionallymandated" federalism "which binds them means that they must cooperate and contribute to the strengthening and guaranteeing of the vested interests of the federation and its members". This means that inherent in a federal state is the existence of a constitutional duty of behavior of its constituent elements "in a friendly way towards the federation" ("bundesfreundlichem Verhalten") (BVerfGE 1, 299, Wohnungsbauförderung, 315; the BVerfG in this case finds historical roots for its reasoning, quoting R. Smend 1968: 247 ss., 261; see also BVerfGE 1, 117, Finanzausgleichsgesetz, 131; and 3, 52, Weihnachtsgeld, 57) .
The principle of Bundestreue is not seen as the establishment of a new legal relationship between subjects, but can support, modify or limit the respective powers and duties within the existing legal relationship. It has a negative dimension (duties of omission) and a positive (duties to aid and assistance) -which shows its proximity to the general principle of cooperation (Stern 1984: 755) .
Does the EU follow a "cooperative federalism" paradigm of administrative implementation of EU law?
How to qualify, then, the administrative implementation system of EU law?
There are several models of administrative enforcement of legislation. As for the EU, given its multilevel structure, it is interesting to take into account the models adopted by federal systems for the administrative implementation of federal legislation. In fact, as in a federal state, the enforcement of federal legislation may be the responsibility of the federation or the states, in the EU the enforcement of EU law may be the responsibility of the Union or the Member States -in both cases one can find two levels: a state level and a supranational level. These models, however, are not directly and incontestably transposable Dual federalism is based on the idea of "dual sovereignty." The Constitution divides sovereignty into two exclusive sets of powers and assigns one to the federation and the other to the federal states. The federal level and the state level hold sovereign spheres of action, acting independently and sometimes concurrently -ideally, no interference between the two spheres exists. The tasks and competences of the federal level are those expressly established in the Constitution, conferring all others to the states. As a result, the relationship between these two levels is one of tension rather than co-operation. Federal and state powers should be absolutely distinct and clear -the federation dealing with national affairs and states of local affairs -as a layer cake, hence the alternative name of "layer cake federalism" (Grodzins 1966: 190; Volden 2005: 327-348, 328 ).
Cooperative federalism is based on the idea that, given the complexities of today's world and the vast public powers, the clear divisions between the various levels of government do not exist or are diffuse, with areas of overlapping or shared competence (i.e. an interpenetration of competencies) being foreseen. Thus, as federal and state powers must be seen as interdependent and deeply interconnected, and the objectives pursued by both of them, to a large extent, the same, it would be best to adopt cooperation as a preferential mode of action: the federal and state levels must interact, cooperating and acting collectively, avoiding conflict or competition. Instead of the existence of two or three levels, or layers, perfectly distinct, -the aforementioned layer-cake -one must recognise that the powers of the federal, state and local authorities intersect and blend, depending on the matters in question, being closer to the image of the mixed layers of a marble cake. The notion of layer cake federalism is therefore opposed by that of marble cake federalism (Grodzins 1966: 8-9, 174; Volden 2005: 327-328) .
German federalism can be considered to be cooperative ("Kooperativer Föderalismus"); it is an expression of federalism in which the various entities present in a federation must cooperate and carry out their tasks together. Since the federation has a significant share of the legislative function and the Länder have a predominant administrative role, there is a natural need for cooperation. This conception of cooperative federalism is the opposite of the idea of competitive federalism ("Wettbewerbsföderalismus"). According to this conception, states should have a wide discretion of action and decision, which creates a competition between them that will reward the most efficient (Hildebrandt et al. 2008: 11-21; Schatz et al. 2000; Zenthöfer 2006: 33 ss.) .
In this context, and related to this distinction, the doctrine traditionally distinguishes between two models of enforcement of federal legislation: the centralised model and the decentralised model. According to the first, the enforcement of federal legislation rests with a federal public administration. In this case, the federation establishes its own administration, autonomous of the states' administrations, and with a jurisdiction coinciding with the scope of its legislative attributions. It is a model more easily derived from dual federalism, because it allows a separation of spheres of federal and state action by reason of matter. This is the model originally adopted by the USA (Schütze 2012: 244 ss.).
In the case of the decentralised model, the implementation of federal legislation is the responsibility of the public administrations of the federal states, the federal administration being of a residual nature and having a small size. There is no correspondence between the legislative powers and the administrative powers of the federation -in principle, the administrative sphere of competence is smaller than the legislative sphere. It is a model close to cooperative federalism, in that it implies interconnection between different levels.
This model, combined with a mechanism of representation of the states, through their executive branches, in the second chamber of the federal legislature, is called executive federalism (Exekutivföderalismus) and is adopted, for instance, by the Federal Republic of Germany (Laufer et al. 1998: 259-260) . This system allows for substantial integration and complementarity between the federal legislative organs and the executive organs of the federal and state level, but gives a relatively minor importance to the Landtage (state parliaments) (Dann 2004: 135 ss.).
The links made between the models of dual federalism and centralised implementation, on the one hand, and cooperative federalism and decentralised implementation, on the other hand, only represent a trend. In fact, it is possible to adopt the model of cooperative federalism, despite the fact that the administrative implementation of federal legislation is exclusively reserved to the federal administration. In this case, the existence of a cooperative relationship can be observed in other aspects. This is what happened in the United States during a phase of its history, when cooperative federalism was adopted during the New Deal, for instance. It is also theoretically possible to set up a model of dual federalism in which there is a rigid separation between legislative and administrative activities -although in this case it is more difficult to classify such a system as pure dual federalism. 
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When comparing the EU with federal models, it should be noted that the European model departs from US federal doctrine.
It is the American Constitution that regulates the balance of power between the federation (the Union) and the states and between their respective legal systems -although much of this depends on interpretation. Its Article VI, paragraph 2, establishes the Supremacy Clause: the prevalence of federal law (the US Constitution, its laws and international conventions). The X Amendment to the US Constitution, which is part of the bill of rights, is the constitutional seat of the principle of American federalism, stating that all powers that are not attributed to the federation by the Constitution, and not prohibited by it, belong to the states or to the people. This Amendment, which clarifies the limits of the powers of the Union -its powers are only those provided for in the Constitution -is nevertheless regarded as redundant by the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court or SCOTUS), which has already stated that this amendment "added nothing to the [Constitution] as originally ratified" (SCOTUS, United States v. Sprague, 1931, 282 U.S. 716, 733 (SCOTUS, United States v. Darby, 1941, 312 U.S. 100, 124) .
Despite these norms, the American Constitution does not expressly define many of the reciprocal boundaries between the state and federal powers. It follows that one of the characteristics of American federalism is the existence of a fluid relationship between the powers of states and federal levels, depending on the interpretation of the Constitution; hence the importance of the Supreme Court's case-law.
In the field of the administrative implementation by the states of federal law, and based on the system of dual federalism, the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court established the anticommandeering principle, for example, in the Printz v. United States case (SCOTUS, Printz v.
United States, 1997, 521 U.S. 898, 918-919, 935) . According to this principle, Congress is prevented from imposing or requiring that the executive authorities of states enforce federal law. The federal authorities cannot issue directives that require the federal states to From this perspective, there is a fundamental difference between the EU and US legal systems. In the USA, it is understood that when a specific subject is attributed to either the federation or the states, their competences in that matter are not only legislative or normative -they are "comprehensive" competences, which cover the administrative implementation of laws and their enforcement. This means that if the competence of the federation covers a particular subject, it includes not only the power to legislate on it, but also the power to execute those federal legislative acts by an autonomous federal administration and by an order of federal courts of its own.
Conversely, in the EU, Article 291 (1) TFEU imposes on the Member States a positive duty to implement EU law (Schütze 2012: 55) . Although the administrative jurisdiction of the supranational level may coincide with its legislative powers (as in the USA) in some areas, that is an exception. The task of administratively implementing and executing the EU legislation rests primarily on the shoulders of the Member States. This is a fundamentally different reality from the US federalism. In the absence of a prima facie correspondence between the legislative powers and the administrative powers of the EU, the scope of its administrative sphere of competence will generally to be more restricted than the legislative sphere, and is also limited by the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity.
On this point, the principle of subsidiarity defines, in areas outside the exclusive competence of the EU, the circumstances in which the Union, rather than the Member From these differences between the two models, two conclusions can be drawn. On the one hand, the autonomy of the federal states in the US is -in this respect -broader than the autonomy of the EU Member States. On the other hand, recourse to the US legal system as a source of inspiration for legal solutions in the EU should always take this structural difference into account. At least in this area, the EU does not represent a European version of the US. 
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The EU model of administrative implementation of legislative acts is closer to the cooperative federalism model, inasmuch as it involves the establishment of cooperative relations between different levels of government. In fact, both with regard to the system of division of competences -where some of the characteristics of executive federalism are present, with the administrative implementation of EU law being seen, in general, as a duty of the Member States -and the organisational structure -with the Council of the EU to assume the role of legislative body representing the Member States, close to a Federal Senate (for instance, the German Bundesrat) -the solutions contained in the Treaties and the interpretation of them by the CJEU seem to be the result of a "federalising" inspiration.
To the extent that the powers transferred to the EU are mostly legislative powersthere being no general provision for the transfer of national administrative powers to the EU -it must be concluded that the EU has a strong legislative (and not administrative) However, the possibility of joint implementation procedures, where the national and supra-national levels intervene, is EU specific, with no correspondence to the German federalist model. The German and European regimes seem to resemble each other in that, in both cases, the legislative function is divided between two levels of power structures -national and supranational -with a functional complementarity between them (Pernice 1999: 724-725) and, in both cases, the administrative function, even of supranational normative acts, tends to belong to the national sphere. There is a vertical separation of powers between the EU and the Member States, similar to the one which exist in federal states with an "executive federalism" model (Parejo Alfonso 2000: 45; Pernice 1999: 724-725; Schütze 2012: 251) .
The system of "executive federalism" adopted is not, however, pure. Indeed, the popular view that European standards are adopted centrally in Brussels, and implemented at national level -as would be the case in a system of pure "executive federalism" -represents an over-simplification of the system. The power to implement EU legislative acts belongs This means that, even though the EU structure of implementation bears some similarities to the German federal model, it has also distinct features.
Is the principle of sincere cooperation a "federalising" influence?
As discussed, the principle of sincere cooperation seems to be inspired, at least in part, by the normative solutions found by federations in ensuring the implementation of supranational legislation. Here, as the EU chose to resort to the national administrations of Member States, it adopted a model analogous to the German-and eschew the US model.
In this sense, the creation by the CJEU of the principle of sincere cooperation appears to have been inspired by the imposition of the duty of execution drawn from the German principle of Bundestreue. But does the closeness of the EU's administrative implementation system with a federal one necessarily imply acceptance of the federal nature of the EU?
The answer is no.
The EU cannot be considered a federal state, because it does not possess the elements necessary for recognition of a State -people, territory and political power (e.g., Feige 1973: 89 ss.).
The principle of sincere cooperation is associated with the functioning of complex decision-making structures -in the sense that they are decentralised -with various levels of action and, especially, in the absence of a hierarchical relationship between the various levels. In this sense, the principle applies not only to federations but to several other nonfederal realities, such as regional states, and must not be considered, by itself, as a federalising element.
To the extent that the Union is a complex power structure which involves decisionmaking processes involving the participation of various levels, the principle of sincere cooperation must be recognised as essential to guaranteeing the survival of the Union. This is especially necessary as there is no hierarchical relationship, either between the Union and the Member States, or between the EU and national legal orders (Bogdandy 2011: 11-55, 41-42; Zuleeg 2011: 763-786, 774-775) . In fact, the principle of sincere cooperation has as one of its objective to provide flexible solutions to the various conflicts that may arise in a political system with multiple levels, such as the Union (Witte 1995: 142; Bogdandy 2011: 51) .
The principle of sincere cooperation therefore corresponds to general mutual obligations of the Member States and the EU, in which the specific content depends on each particular case, the provisions of the Treaty or the rules resulting from its general system (Case 78/70, Deutsche Grammophon Gesellschaft mbH v Metro-SB-Großmärkte GmbH & Co. KG, 1971 ECR 487, p. 5; Case 2/73, Riseria Luigi Geddo v Ente Nazionale Risi, 1973 ECR 865, p. 4 ; see also Lang, 1986: 505) .
The parallel established between the principle of sincere cooperation (as Gemeinschaftstreue) and the federal Bundestreue does not require resistance to a transformation of the EU into a federal state; this does not imply the permanent and unlimited growth of the competences of the EU which could only result from the exercise of the constituent power of the European peoples. It is restricted to aspects of "fidelity" to the supra-national organisation in which the States agreed to be part.
